In his inaugural address on 20 January 1981, Ronald Reagan detailed a number of economic problems that had humbled previous US President Jimmy Carter. In Reagan's words, the United States was confronted with an 'economic affliction of great proportions' (Reagan, 1981, p. 211) . This economic affliction encompassed the following: sustained inflation, increased unemployment, idle industries, high taxes and mounting federal deficits. This outlining of economic ills prefaced Reagan's inaugural coup de grace -that 'government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem ' (ibid., p. 212) . With these simple words, Reagan articulated the terms not only of his economic diagnosis but also of his corresponding economic prescription.
In pinpointing the federal government as the locus of economic difficulties, Reagan set the stage to curb the size and influence of Washington. A central component of Reagan's government downsizing was an attack on the US welfare system. With welfare publicly perceived as both contributing to big government and negatively affecting the economy (i.e., acting as a disincentive to save and work), retrenching social provision addressed a number of the administration's stated and unstated economic objectives -smaller government, increased productivity and greater labour force flexibility. As Reagan himself stated: 'In the days ahead, I will propose removing the roadblocks that have slowed our economy and reduced productivity' (Reagan, 1981, p. 214) . It was the administration's belief that measures had to be taken that would liberate both the entrepreneur and the worker from the suffocating nature of the federal government.
Reagan's election victory was a watershed in American history because it signalled the end of the New Deal order (see the essays in Fraser and Gerstle, 1989) . From the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt through the administration of Jimmy Carter, government intervention in the economy, downward redistribution of income and government spending for social provision were considered national priorities. With the election of Reagan, the political ideas, policies and alliances associated with the New Deal were challenged. As, arguably, the most ideological president in modern American history, Reagan expedited the eclipse of the New Deal order through a concerted and relentless critique of big government.
With welfare reform once again dominating the US political agenda on both the federal and state levels, it is important to reconsider the nature and form of the Reagan administration's attack on welfare. One cannot fully understand George Bush's benign neglect of welfare policy, the Clinton White House's promise to 'end welfare as we know it' or the welfare reform legislation recently (1996) signed into law without first examining Reagan's welfare legacy. In what follows, I first examine three pieces of welfare legislation passed under Reagan. Second, I briefly review the administration's welfare retrenchment record. And, finally, I explore some of the ways in which the administration forestalled future welfare system expansion.
R E AG A N ' S W E L FA R E L E G I S L AT I O N
In the United States, the welfare system is composed of three main components: means-tested, social insurance and human capital programmes.
1 Both the means-tested and social insurance programmes of the welfare system had their origins in the Social Security Act of 1935, whereas the majority of human capital programmes were initiated in the Kennedy-Johnson War on Poverty period. Compared to many European welfare systems, which are characterised by their universal programmes and extensive range of services and benefits, US social provision is strongly residual in nature, relying primarily on selective means-tested programmes. In relating the story of Reagan's assault on welfare, emphasis will be placed on legislative change enacted to force the able-bodied poor off the rolls.
As both governor of California and US president, Reagan was always a harsh critic of means-tested programmes for the able-bodied poor. His critique was twofold. As an economic conservative, Reagan blamed the country's economic stagnation on both the high taxes needed to finance government welfare expenditures and the lack of a productive contribution from welfare recipients. Pointing toward growing federal deficits and a bloated federal bureaucracy, the Reagan White House wanted to end welfare waste, fraud and abuse by tightening welfare eligibility requirements. As part of this strategy, Reagan hoped to return administrative control and funding responsibilities back to the individual states. As a social conservative, Reagan also believed that social provision for those who were not truly needy undermined society's work ethic and encouraged (and consequently rewarded) dependency. The administration's goal of welfare reform was further intended to re-emphasise the importance of family, responsibility and work. Again, by restricting programme eligibility rules and lowering benefit levels, the President hoped to force parents to support their children and to require able-bodied recipients to work. This combined economic and ideological critique determined the administration's legislative agenda of reduced welfare costs, restricted eligibility criteria and forced change in recipient behaviour. Over Reagan's eight years, the US welfare system was retrenched by three pieces of legislation: the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981; the Social Security Amendments of 1983; and the Family Support Act of 1988. 2 In the following sections, a short legislative history, a synopsis of provisions and the impact of each piece of legislation is presented. Although the origins and nature of each piece of legislation differed, the end result was a curtailing of the federal welfare system established during the New Deal and expanded over the War on Poverty period.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981
The OBRA legislation originated solely within the administration. Three weeks before Reagan's inauguration, the administration's budget director David Stockman had prepared fifty to sixty policy papers outlining $40 billion in budget cuts (Greider, 1981) . These hastily produced budget alterations took an unusual and controversial path through Congress. Concerned that Reagan's budget-cut package would unravel on the hill, Stockman utilised the obscure Congressional Budget Reconciliation procedures, whereby budget resolutions go through a series of steps that force Congress to 'reconcile' its actions with a tentative spending resolution (Joe and Rogers, 1985) . These budget reconciliation procedures simultaneously limited congressional amendments and transcended strict committee lines. In a crucial vote on whether or not to adopt these procedures, conservative Democrats (personally lobbied by Reagan) and Republicans within the House of Representatives garnered enough votes to force a single up-or-down vote on the White House's omnibus appropriation bill (Joe and Rogers, 1985; Ferejohn, 1991) . On 31 July, 1981, Congress voted on and passed the finalized OBRA version which contained over $30 billion in potential savings. Within seven months of taking office, Reagan signed the 600 page bill into law on 13 August. By changing and restricting eligibility criteria, reducing benefits and clamping down on users of multiple programmes, the OBRA lowered and narrowed the US social safety net, with means-tested programmes being especially hard hit.
In a context of previously falling outlays (federal expenditures earmarked for some income-support programmes were reduced under Carter), the expenditure impact of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act was somewhat minimal, while programmatic change was profound. Calculating projected welfare outlays from a pre-Reagan baseline, Bawden and Palmer (1984) highlight the extent of OBRA change. According to these data, all three components of the welfare system suffered cuts and alterations. Means-tested programme outlays such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Food Stamps and Medicaid were reduced by 14.3 per cent, 13.8 per cent and 2.8 per cent respectively. Social insurance programmes were cut as well. Social Security (an earnings-related contributory state pension scheme), the most expensive social welfare programme, and the one programme whose elderly recipients have a strong political voice, suffered a 4.6 per cent reduction. Likewise, both the Medicare and Unemployment Insurance programmes were cut 6.8 per cent and 17.4 per cent from their pre-Reagan policy baselines. Human capital programmes -education and employmentwere also singled out. The administration cut both Guaranteed Student Loans and Compensatory Education by 39 per cent and 19.5 per cent respectively. The General Employment and Training programme was cut 38.6 per cent from the pre-Reagan baseline, with Public Service Employment being eliminated altogether.
Another way to see the impact of the OBRA legislation apart from expenditure reduction is to consider programme parameter change. The programme restrictions outlined in Table 1 were all the responsibility of the Reagan administration. Because of space limitations, only drastic changes in the AFDC programme will be recounted here. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, which is jointly funded by the federal and state-level governments, provides income-support benefits to those families meeting specific income, asset and demographic criteria. With no federally mandated minimum benefit and few federally imposed eligibility conditions, individual states retain control over both benefit levels and eligibility requirements. As such, AFDC benefits are generally very low (in the median state in 1987 the maximum monthly benefit for a threeperson family was $359) and vary widely from state to state (in 1987 the maximum monthly benefit for a three-person family in Alabama was $118 compared to $749 in Alaska) (Shapiro and Greenstein, 1988) . Because the majority of states do not adjust their AFDC benefits to keep pace with inflation, the value of AFDC benefits has fallen over time. According to Handler (1995) , the average AFDC grant per recipient has declined by 45 per cent over 1970 to 1993 due to inflation. In making AFDC eligibility more restrictive, the administration began to curb some of the freedom available to individual states. For example, the OBRA implemented a gross income ceiling of no greater than 150 per cent of a state's needs standard (the amount of income necessary for a family to achieve a reasonable standard of living within a given state). That is, in any given month, if a family's gross income exceeded more than 150 per cent of the state's needs standard that family was now ineligible for AFDC. Programme eligibility was also narrowed by counting a Harpham, 1984; Palmer and Sawhill, 1984; Smeeding, 1984. family's gross rather than net income, and by including a portion of stepparents' income in computing AFDC eligibility (Bawden and Palmer, 1984; Palmer and Sawhill, 1984) . Other provisions that restricted AFDC eligibility included the following: reducing allowable assets from $2,000 to $1,000; limiting the eligibility of aid for pregnant women to their sixth month; and reducing the age of eligible children from 21 to 18 years (Dunn, 1984; Palmer and Sawhill, 1984) . In decreasing AFDC benefits, the administration gave states the option of counting Food Stamps and housing subsidies in determining their benefit levels, and the OBRA mandated that no benefit under $10 per month be paid (Dunn, 1984) . In addition to provisions that restricted eligibility and reduced benefits, the OBRA contained a number of specific provisions that, from the administration's point of view, would increase an AFDC recipient's incentive to work. These included a $75 ceiling for work-related expenses and a $160 per month child care deduction (Dunn, 1984) . The OBRA legislation also stipulated that the $30 and one-third earning deduction be terminated after four months of employment in any twelve month period Dunn, 1984; Palmer and Sawhill, 1984) . 3 The AFDC provisions of the OBRA highlight the administration's wish to see the federal government cease subsidising employed AFDC recipients. In reducing the perceived attractiveness of AFDC among working recipients, Reagan was trying to force them to maintain their labour supply availability.
A more overt attempt by the administration to alter the labour supply status of recipients was found in the OBRA provisions giving states the option to implement workfare programmes. As governor of California during the 1970s, Reagan implemented a pilot workfare programme forcing able-bodied recipients to work for their welfare benefits. While the programme had limited success, it established Reagan as a champion of compulsory participation of welfare recipients in work-related activities. Apart from reducing welfare rolls and encouraging self-sufficiency, Reagan believed (as many conservatives and liberals now agree) that workfare instils in welfare recipients a sense of social obligation, moral duty and employment experience and skills. With the advent of Reagan's OBRA legislation, state-administered work programmes became a major element in all future welfare reform. Regardless of the nature of the work, the exorbitant administrative costs or its questionable effectiveness, Republicans and Democrats came to agree that workfare is preferable to welfare .
Although Reagan originally had wanted to implement a national workfare programme, the 1981 legislation did allow states to convert the Work Incentive (WIN) programme into a block grant (Community Work Experience programmes) administered by state welfare agencies. This change gave states the flexibility to implement workfare demonstration projects. According to Schiller and Brasher (1990) , by 1986, twenty-five states had authorised workfare for AFDC recipients. However, with WIN funding falling by 70 per cent over 1981 to 1987, workfare was implemented more often as a county option rather than as a state-wide programme (Gueron, 1988) . Nonetheless, these limited workfare experiments would play an important role in the administration's welfare changes in the late eighties.
As some authors have pointed out, the ultimate impact of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act could never be known (Joe and Rogers, 1985) . This was due to many different factors. First, the OBRA welfare cuts took place during a severe recession. At the same time that the administration reduced the pool of families eligible for AFDC, a poor economy increased that very same pool. Second, while most states welcomed the Reagan changes, some states did attempt to counteract federal policies. These states took action to negate or limit the intended effects of the OBRA legislation. In the majority of these cases, states attempted to minimize the effect of the changes on recipients by raising their needs standard (Joe and Rogers, 1985) . Finally, the impact of the OBRA was clouded by judicial interpretation, with AFDC benefits being reinstated in some cases. Given the three levels of American government and the involvement of the legal system, the intended consequences of the OBRA did not follow a direct line from Congress to recipient.
There are, however, many studies that have specified the effect of the OBRA on AFDC. For example, studies specified OBRA's role in increasing poverty (Danziger, 1983) , reducing AFDC caseloads (Griffith and Usher, 1986) , and forcing the working poor off the AFDC rolls (Moscovice and Craig, 1984) . General Accounting Office (GAO) studies concluded that the AFDC caseload decreased by 442,000 cases compared to what the caseload would have been in the absence of OBRA, generating a projected monthly savings of $93 million (Hutchens, 1986) . With the above cuts and alterations, the OBRA attempted to create both a leaner, more efficient federal government and a more pliable labour force.
Social Security Amendments (SSA) of 1983
As a long-established social insurance programme, Old-Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) -commonly known as Social Security -is considered to be immune from political attack. The Reagan presidency's relationship to Social Security both challenged and confirmed this belief. With the administration's budget cutting agenda the expensive Social Security programme -the mainstream contributory retirement pensions systemwas, in fact, on the chopping block. In May 1981, with the OBRA making its initial passage through the House of Representatives, the White House put forth its plan to address Social Security. These proposals, drawn up by Stockman, had a dual purpose -to help balance the Reagan budget and to release some of the financial pressure on the OASI programme (Harpham, 1984) . The White House Social Security cuts focused on three main areas: first, benefits were to be reduced for early retirees and benefits for children of retired workers were to be eliminated; second, automatic benefit cost-of-living adjustments were to be delayed by three months and reduced significantly; and third, the formula used to calculate benefits would be changed, resulting in reduced benefits for those retiring in the next century (Svhan and Ross, 1983; Harpham, 1984) . These cuts were projected to save anywhere from $12 to $16 billion. The programme was saved from Reagan's cuts only by the mobilization of a diverse political coalition (e.g., Save Our Security), which forced the Republican controlled Senate to vote against the President.
By way of damage control, the administration established the National Commission on Social Security Reform (NCSSR) on 16 December, 1981. The bipartisan NCSSR had the task of finding a non-partisan solution to the short and long-term problems of the OASI programme (Svhan and Ross, 1983) . According to Ozawa (1984) , OASI had experienced an annual reduction in its trust fund of $790 million to $4.9 billion over the years 1975 to 1981. In the short term, due to this prolonged state of expenditures exceeding revenues, Social Security was expected to be totally insolvent by July 1983. In the long term, OASI faced financial difficulties due to demographic change -in the next century there would be fewer workers to support more, longer-living beneficiaries. Although there was disagreement within the NCSSR about how to solve these longterm problems, the commission was unanimous in its assessment of the OASI's immediate problem. The NCSSR recommended that between the years 1983 and 1989 the Social Security programme needed to either increase revenues or reduce expenditures by some $150 to $200 billion (Svhan and Ross, 1983; Ozawa, 1984) .
With no changes by the administration, and minimal mark-ups in the House and the Senate, the congressional Social Security conference committee report was passed in the House by a vote of 243 to 102, and in the Senate by a vote of 58 to 14 (Svhan and Ross, 1983) . In its final form, the new law was to provide a total of $166.2 billion over the period 1983-9 (ibid.). First, in order to increase revenues, the 1983 SSA raised the payroll tax rates for both employees and employers equally, and tax rates for self-employed persons were made equal to the combined employee-employer rates. Social Security revenues were also raised by bringing new federal and private tax-exempt non-profit organization employees under compulsory coverage. Ozawa (1984) projected that the above tax increases, and the compulsory coverage, would raise $58 billion in revenues over the six years 1983-9. Second, Reagan instituted a number of provisions that also decreased Social Security benefits: cost-of-living adjustments were to be made according to the calendar year rather than the fiscal year (i.e., January rather than July); Social Security benefit automatic increases were to be linked to either the lowest increase in wages or in prices; and, if the revenue/expenditure level fell below a given percentage, and if the income of recipients exceeded a base amount, up to one-half of the benefit was now considered as taxable income. This change was projected to save $27 billion over 1983-9 (Ozawa, 1984) . In an effort to clampdown on 'windfall benefits' -where individuals receive a high return on short-term contributions -a different method of computing benefits was to be utilised for high-wage workers who had worked for only a short time. Finally, the 1983 SSA contained provisions that decreased the rate of retirement. These provisions attempted to deal with the long-term problems of Social Security. For example, by 2022, an individual would have to be 67 years old to receive full OASI benefits. In addition, there was a liberalisation of the restriction on earnings after retirement and the credit for delayed retirement was increased.
Compared to the OBRA, the 1983 Social Security changes did not have the clear budget-cutting imprint of the administration. The OASI programme was only retrenched under the cover of a trust fund crisis. However, the Social Security alterations did affect almost everyoneelderly people, workers and future recipients. The provisions of the Social Security Amendments, in resolving the short-term crisis of Social Security, were an amalgamation of tax increases and benefit reductions. Apart from the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act tax increase, the 1983 SSA provisions included the largest net tax increase of the decade (Stewart, 1991) . With the employer's share of the payroll tax being seemingly passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, and low-income workers paying the same rate as those in higher income brackets, the 1983 Social Security Amendments may have unwittingly exacerbated what is perceived in the USA as an unresolved issue of intergenerational inequity, whereby fewer taxpayers face an increased burden in supporting longer-living Social Security recipients (Ozawa, 1984) .
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Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988
The third piece of retrenchment legislation, the Family Support Act, can be traced to Reagan's 1986 State of the Union address. In that speech, Reagan once again blamed the breakdown of the US family on welfare, and stated that child poverty, crime and poor schools all resulted from a damaging 'welfare culture'. The President then announced that he would direct the Domestic Policy Council to reevaluate the entire US welfare system. By 1987, the White House, the Senate and the House of Representatives had all produced welfare reform proposals. After months of negotiation, House Representative Thomas Downey and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan reached a conference compromise on the Family Support Act. 4 This compromise was hindered by Senate negotiators having to clear House suggestions with the administration, and the House negotiators struggling to retain the fragile support of House liberals. With Congress operating within parameters set by the White House, the administration capitulated on most provisions except the cost of the bill and the workfare provisions (Tolchin, 1988) . The FSA -watered down from the viewpoint of both staunch liberals and conservativeswas overwhelmingly passed in the House (347 to 53) and in the Senate (96 to 1) (Szanton, 1991) . On 13 October, 1988, the FSA became law, forcing parental responsibility and workfare on AFDC recipients. Unlike the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, the FSA was implemented gradually, and the net cost to the federal government was estimated at only $3.3 billion (Focus, 1988-9) .
Devoted to strengthening the family, forcing paid work on recipients, and giving states more administrative control, the Family Support Act consolidated and extended many of the administration's 1981 welfare changes. In all, the FSA was made up of five different components: child support; employment and training; support services for families; AFDC alterations; and welfare demonstration projects (Focus, 1988-9) . With regard to family, the FSA stipulated that parents must be financially responsible for their children. Beginning in November 1990, through the creation of the Child Support Enforcement Office, states were required to withhold the wages of absent fathers as a means of collecting child support. Similar to the original White House proposals, the FSA authorised the creation of demonstration projects, where states could experiment in ways of enhancing the lives of poor families. In particular, the FSA allocated funds for innovative training and education programmes for children, for projects where AFDC recipients were paid as child care providers, and for projects that allowed non-custodial parents access to their children (Focus, 1988-9) .
The provisions on job opportunities and training for AFDC recipientsthe cornerstone of the Family Support Act -extended the workfare option contained in OBRA 1981. As mandated, all states were to establish and implement a Job Opportunities and Basic Skills training programme (JOBS), through which AFDC recipients would be educated, trained and employed in order to escape extended welfare dependency (Focus, 1988-9) . Although the states had great leeway in designing their JOBS programmes, there were a number of concrete federal guidelines. First, all states were to have their JOBS programme up and running by 1 October 1990 . Second, all AFDC recipients with children over the age of 3 (or 1 in some states) were required to participate in the JOBS programme. Third, recipients under the age of 20 without a high school diploma were forced to work toward such a diploma. And finally, those recipients who were required to participate but failed to do so, or who refused offers of employment, faced benefit reductions (Focus, 1988-9) . Federal funding depended partly on states reaching specified target percentages of recipient participation in JOBS. For example, 7 per cent of eligible AFDC recipients were required to be involved by 1993, and 20 per cent by 1995 (Chilman, 1992) .
The new law contained a number of benefit improvements as well. For instance, under the FSA, all states were required to implement an Aid to Families with Dependent Children -Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) programme. The AFDC-UP programme had been optional nationally, with only twenty-seven states offering the programme. This provision ensured that jobless fathers were entitled to live at home without disqualifying their families from AFDC. Moreover, the FSA raised the earned income disregard (the amount a recipient can keep before benefits are reduced) by $15 -from $75 to $90; the childcare disregard was also increased from $160 a month to $175 (Focus, 1988-9) . In an attempt to aid working AFDC recipients, the FSA provided support services for families, with childcare and Medicaid extended for up to one year once a recipient secured employment.
The FSA was neither a drastic nor a comprehensive transformation of the existing welfare system. From the very beginning it was believed that the Family Support Act was going to bring about a very small reduction in both overall welfare expenditures (approximately a 1 per cent drop) and AFDC case-rolls (around 50,000 families) (Chilman, 1992; Stoesz and Karger, 1992) . The federal cost of the new bill was estimated at $3.3 billion over five years, with the cost to individual states at approximately $.7 billion. As Chilman (1992) notes, funding for the FSA was appropriated by Congress only through 1991. Additional funding, while it was authorised, needed to be appropriated for each fiscal year through 1995. Thus a poor economy would immediately put the new law in a precarious position on both the federal and state level.
A General Accounting Office (GAO) (1991) study on the JOBS programme showed that while all the states were successful in creating their welfare-to-work programmes by October 1990, there were many obstacles to helping recipients become economically self-sufficient. Because part of the funding of the JOBS programme occurs by a process of federal matching of state outlays, one-third of all available federal JOBS funds went unused due to reduced state spending on their welfare-to-work programmes. This lack of funding at the state level was due to an extremely poor economy that resulted in both budgetary problems and a lack of employment opportunities. In the GAO study, three-quarters of all the states indicated that the demand for employment opportunities far exceeded the supply. With unemployment increasing in the early nineties, JOBS spending was in direct competition with other welfare programmes for resources.
R E AG A N ' S W E L FA R E R E T R E N C H M E N T R E C O R D
In moving from specific pieces of legislation to an overall assessment of the administration's record in retrenching social welfare, it is important to keep in mind that Reagan focused on both specific programme parameter change and broad budgetary reductions. This attack on social provision was a political constant throughout Reagan's two terms. Although many analysts focus solely on Reagan's first term, it should be noted that even Reagan's final budget (submitted in January 1989) called for more than $30 billion in cuts over 80 programmes (Schick, 1990) .
There are numerous quantitative measures that can be used to highlight the overall budgetary change in social welfare that occurred under Reagan and, depending on what measure is utilised, the assessment of the administration will vary. In acknowledging this, three different measures will be presented below to evaluate the administration's actions. These measures include the following: welfare outlays as a percentage of total federal spending; federal expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and spending levels for specific categories of welfare programmes.
In looking at federal social welfare as a percentage of total federal spending (see Figure 1) , it is clear that the Reagan administration accelerated the decline that had started in the mid-seventies. From fiscal year (FY) 1980 to FY 1989, federal welfare expenditures fell from 54.4 per cent to 49.5 per cent, hitting a low of 48.6 per cent in 1986. With military spending and payment on the national debt continuing to grow, the Reagan administration was successful in reducing federal welfare outlays as a percentage of all federal government expenditures over its two terms. In turning to federal welfare expenditures as a proportion of GDP, the Reagan administration also was successful in reducing the federal percentage while simultaneously forcing an increase in the state and local government share. As a percentage of GDP, federal welfare spending fell from 11.4 per cent in FY1980 to 10.9 per cent in FY1989 (KallmanBixby, 1992 ). This small decline (0.5 per cent) in federal welfare expenditures was offset by an increase in the state and local government percentage (7.2 per cent in 1980 to 7.6 per cent in 1989).
While the decreases in federal welfare expenditures as both a proportion of total federal spending and GDP represent a success for the administration, federal welfare spending for specific categories of programme did increase throughout the eighties in real terms. According to Falk (1988) , in constant 1987 dollars, there was an overall 14 per cent increase in federal outlays for social welfare programmes from FY1980 (outlays totalled $439 billion) to FY1987 (outlays totalled $502 billion). As expected, however, there were substantial differences in spending trends across different welfare programmes (see Figure 2) . Over 1980 to 1987, there were substantial increases in constant dollar outlays for retired and disabled workers (Social Security increased by 26 per cent) and in health programmes (a 68 per cent increase in Medicare), whereas 0 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Figure 1: Federal social welfare as a percentage of total welfare spending Source: Kallman-Bixby, 1992 Unemployment Compensation and Education, Training, Employment and Social Services (ETESS) both declined by one-third. In FY1987, Social Security and other retirement benefits accounted for half of all federal welfare programme outlays, with one-quarter allocated to health programmes (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid, etc.) and the remaining onequarter divided among income security programmes, unemployment compensation, veterans benefits and ETESS (Falk, 1988) . Thus, the administration, with all its expenditure cuts and programme parameter changes, had only limited success in retrenching welfare in budgetary terms.
Though Reagan was unable to reduce federal welfare spending outright in real terms, the administration was successful in slowing the growth rate of real non-defence federal spending. While the growth rate had been slowing since the late 1970s, Reagan's annual average growth rate (2.6 per cent) was still below that of his presidential predecessors Carter (3.7 per cent), Ford (7.1 per cent), Nixon (6.7 per cent), Johnson (6.7 per cent), Kennedy (7.5 per cent) and Eisenhower (5.8 per cent) (Barro, 1991) . In sharply restraining the rate of growth, Reagan successfully redirected government policy away from the unlimited welfare expansion characteristic of most of the 1960s and 1970s.
This seemingly contradictory result of increased real spending for different programme categories amidst decreases in federal welfare expenditures as a proportion of total federal spending and of GDP was due to a FY 1980 to FY 1987 Source: Falk, 1988 number of factors, such as modest restorations of some of the administration's cuts by Congress, the severe recession of the early eighties, increased medical costs, the growing elderly population and the general intractability of entitlements. As seen in Figure 2 , those categories of welfare programme that experienced real outlay growth were largely entitlements. With many indexed and quasi-indexed (to either prices or wages) entitlements beyond the control of the executive or congressional appropriations committees, the Reagan administration -despite all its effortswas forced to spend more as it cut back (Schick, 1990) . In conclusion, the Reagan record was limited in terms of its budgetary goals, but largely successful in terms of the direction and magnitude of programmatic change. Under Reagan, while welfare still grew -albeit slowly -it was clearly more stingy and punitive. Of course, as evidenced by the discussion on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act and the Family Support Act above, the administration's many programme eligibility and benefit changes have had an important and significant impact on the lives of impoverished individuals. Although the number of AFDC families has largely remained stable throughout most of the eighties (it increased sharply over 1989 to 1992), AFDC participation rates (a measure that takes into account the number of female headed households in the US) have fallen over the course of time. Over most of the Reagan years, with increased state authority, these participation rates declined even further and then stabilised (see Figure 3) . In 1987 the AFDC participation rate for female US Social Welfare Policy 51 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Moffitt, 1992 heads with children was 42 per cent compared to 53 per cent in 1981. Additionally, when we look at aggregate data on AFDC and employment, the broad impact of Reagan's programme parameter change becomes evident. While one must be cautious about making any statements about the behavioral responses to AFDC alterations, there are data that show a substantial decrease in the following areas: the percentage of AFDC recipients working; the percentage of employed AFDC recipients working full time; and, in the amount of real monthly earnings of AFDC recipients during the Reagan eighties (Moffitt, 1992) . In 1975, for example, 18 per cent of AFDC recipients were working compared to only 6 per cent in 1987. 5 These decreases reflect the fact that work-eligible AFDC recipients were largely excluded from the rolls.
Apart from being the first administration since the expansion of the US welfare system to ask for explicit cuts in programmes, the Reagan years were marked by increased levels of both inequality and poverty. According to , the poorest tenth of the population lost 20.3 per cent of its post-tax income over the years 1977 to 1992, while the income of the top one per cent increased 135.7 per cent. With regard to poverty, the Reagan administration maintained extremely high levels. Data show that the number of poor people in the US increased by over 3 million from 1980 to 1988 (Plotnick, 1993) . In forging a welfare consensus that centred on the welfare goals of cost reduction, eligibility restriction and forced change in recipient behaviour, Reagan's welfare legacy, then, is one in which welfare system expansion has been summarily precluded for the foreseeable future. This was achieved through three processes: restructuring the welfare system's organisational foundation, subtly shifting the welfare debate and redefining the contours of acceptable welfare reform. Thus, the administration effectively reframed the parameters of the welfare 'policy space' through its questioning of the entire system's efficiency and utility.
Restructuring social provision
Reagan's attempt at restructuring social provision took four different forms: increased marketisation; benefit substitution; modification in forms of financing; and alterations in administration. In trying to scale back the public sector, the administration -as seen in both the 1984 Grace Commission and in the 1988 President's Commission on Privatisation reports -looked towards marketising social welfare services. Believing that private, for-profit agencies could provide welfare services in a more efficient and cost-effective manner, Reagan looked to marketisation as a way to lower expenditures, reduce government involvement and diversify service delivery. Although there was much talk about replacing Social Security with individual retirement accounts (IRAs), under Reagan marketisation was most apparent in the areas of nursing homes (for-profit organisations accounted for 60 per cent of all new homes over the years 1977-87), hospitals (for-profit providers grew by 28 per cent over 1980-9), and childcare (for-profit establishments increased by 80 per cent over 1977-87) (Salamon, 1993) . With private sector involvement having increased over time in the nursing home and hospital industries, the administration was especially instrumental in extending the marketisation of childcare services. In addition to reducing federal funding and eliminating minimum standards of childcare, the White House created incentives for parents to purchase childcare in the private market by increasing tax credits and demand-side vouchers (Kamerman and Kahn, 1989) . The administration argued that the efficiency, quality and innovation of social services would be enhanced by restructuring welfare through the market mechanism.
Another form of welfare restructuring was the substitution of indirect tax expenditures for direct welfare expenditures. This was accomplished primarily through the increased reliance on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC, enacted in 1975, was originally intended to do two things: first, offset the social security taxes paid by low wage earners; and second, increase the work incentives of the working poor. With receipt of the EITC not dependent upon a recipient's assets, poor individuals receive a yearly refund when their tax credit exceeds the amount of tax due. The EITC had been a long-time Reagan favorite as an alternative to welfare. In fact, as California governor, Reagan made his only congressional appearance testifying on behalf of EITC's work incentive virtues. With the value of the maximum income credit falling by 35 per cent in real terms over 1975 to 1984, the White House's Tax Reform Act of 1986 restored the EITC's value to its 1975 level (Steuerle and Wilson, 1987) . Over the course of the administration, while direct welfare expenditures were being attacked and people were being tossed off the rolls, the total amount of EITC rebates and the number of families who received them increased substantially (Hoffman and Seidman, 1990) .
As an indicator of welfare restructuring, any change in financing is extremely important. Under the Reagan administration, welfare financing was constrained in two main ways. First, the US tax structure became increasingly more regressive during the 1980s, with the tax burden being transferred onto the backs of the lower and middle classes. Through corporate tax breaks, reduced income tax rates for the wealthy, and increased payroll taxes (in which the employer portion is passed on to the employees in the form of lower wages), the progressivity of the US tax system diminished. This is particularly evident when one considers taxation and the poor. For example, starting in 1981, the federal tax threshold for a family of four fell below the poverty line, resulting in poor families paying federal income taxes (Joe and Rogers, 1985) . From 1981 to 1984, due to Economic Recovery Tax Act cuts, people below the poverty line were helping to pay for whatever welfare benefits they may have been receiving. Even in 1986, the income tax threshold was still only 82 per cent of the poverty line, close to the largest gap ever recorded (Terrell, 1986) . Second, with budget deficits averaging more than $170 billion per year, the White House successfully used the goal of deficit reduction to put downward pressure on welfare expenditures (Schick, 1990) . Because military spending was a presidential priority and tax revenues were drastically curtailed, there were simply less federal resources available for welfare programmes. In allowing the national debt to reach $2.8 trillion by the end of his second term, Reagan, fiscally, preempted any chances of welfare expansion by succeeding administrations.
Change in welfare administration was the final component in Reagan's effort to restructure welfare institutions. During the Reagan years, a redirection in the level of welfare administration took place through an approach called 'New Federalism'. This initiative attempted to improve programme effectiveness and lower costs by returning administrative control and funding responsibilities back to individual states. This divestiture of federal responsibility occurred through three main mechanisms. First, the administration, with the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, replaced federal categorical grants with a more flexible block grant system. With state government closer to the people, block grants -large one-time sums of money -provided states with a further incentive to improve the administration of their programmes and the determination of recipient eligibility. In all, fifty-four 'categorical' programmes were consolidated into nine block grants, covering such areas as social services, health services and low-income energy assistance (Liner, 1989) . Second, although the administration's proposed federal/state 'swap' of the Medicaid (from the state to the federal level) and AFDC (from the federal to the state level) programmes was overwhelmingly rejected by congress, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) was replaced by the Job Training Partnership Act, giving states a greater say in the allocation of funds. Finally, in 1987, Reagan signed Executive Order 12612, which mandated maximum flexibility for states in the administration of federal programmes (Farber, 1989) . All federal agencies were forced to send proposals to the Office of Management and Budget in order to have their level of 'federalism' assessed. Although the White House did not get all its proposals enacted, the administration's New Federalism was among its most important and long-lasting policy changes, giving states a greater say in the allocation of federal welfare resources.
Shifting the welfare debate
As Reagan attempted to attack the welfare system organisationally, he also attacked it rhetorically. Budget cuts, programmatic change and institutional restructuring were all justified and rationalised through a subtle shift in emphasis in the existing welfare discourse. This change in language focused on two issues: first, articulating the notion that welfare dependency was the problem, not poverty; and, second, highlighting welfare's interaction with race and gender. In shifting the welfare debate, the administration did its best to shape popular political consciousness and understanding.
Guided and legitimised by a number of popular conservative critiques of welfare (e.g., the work of George Gilder, Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead), the administration shifted the welfare debate towards the real or imagined shortcomings of welfare recipients and away from structural explanations of poverty. In pointing out the recidivism of welfare families who move on and off the rolls, the composition of welfare households (i.e., single mothers and their children), and the existence of intergenerational welfare families, Reagan argued that welfare led to moral decline. As such, the White House utilised stereotypes and overgeneralisations to advance and sustain its own moralistic view of poverty. By successfully concentrating on the perceived perverse effects of being on welfare, the administration disseminated an understanding of welfare that was devoid of any concern about poverty. This triumph of moralism was seen in the Family Support Act of 1988 where programmatic change occurred in the direction of strengthening family ties, increased responsibility on the part of recipients and workfare. Behaviour modification and value resocialisation were not only the Reagan answers to poverty but also the answers to welfare dependency.
This subtle shift from a concern about poverty to a war on dependency ignored two important points. First, there was a large turnover in the poverty population, with the majority of poverty spells ending within three years (Gottschalk et al., 1994) . And second, research showed that households generally used welfare services for no more than two years (Rank, 1988) . This meant that to the extent that an impoverished, dependent welfare class existed, it was extremely small and largely insignificant. While the dependency problem was overstated by conservative critics, it was used politically by the administration to help justify its retrenchment of social provision.
Apart from emphasising dependency over poverty, the administration also allowed the word welfare to be further coded by race and gender. While it is true, historically, that social welfare had always been touched by race and gender relations, the Reagan White House clearly made public statements that appealed to Americans who view welfare in racist and sexist terms. The administration's use of terms like 'welfare queen' and 'the underclass' conjured up and reinforced images of sexually promiscuous, drug-using and lawless minorities. Given that Reagan boasted of his opposition to civil rights on the campaign trail, and that federal anti-discrimination policies were weakened considerably after he became president, it is not surprising that life worsened for many racial minorities and women under Reagan. Studies have outlined how Reagan's welfare policies have negatively affected minority families and individuals through welfare termination (Wolock et al., 1985-6; Amott, 1990) . For minorities, both on and off welfare, levels of inequality increased sharply with Reagan as president. Due to the administration's actions, obtaining AFDC benefits was made more difficult for women, job training and childcare were underfunded, and the value of benefits continued to decline. Even though numerically more whites than blacks live in poverty, the administration actively encouraged the promulgation of welfare myths and stereotypes.
The new welfare reform consensus Over time, Reagan's critique of, and attack on, welfare provision has been increasingly accepted by both Republicans and Democrats. This acceptance is evident in the development of a new bipartisan consensus over what constitutes welfare reform. Prior to the 1980s, welfare reform often meant expanding the availability of benefits and services (Stoesz and Karger, 1991) . Today, welfare reform means sharpening the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor, as well as reducing welfare costs, restricting eligibility criteria and changing recipient behaviour. This new consensus on the meaning of welfare reform is reflected in the proposed and enacted legislation of succeeding administrations and the welfare proposals emerging from Congress.
In looking back at President George Bush's four years, welfare programmes were at different times both targeted and ignored. Although Bush called for significant welfare cuts in his 1990 to 1993 budget proposals, an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress kept Bush from getting many of the cuts he requested. Reagan's influence on his successor, Bush, can be seen in the latter's two meek attempts at welfare reform. Early in his administration Bush continued the trend toward welfare restructuring by appealing to voluntary sector organisations and religious groups ('a thousand points of light') to help provide social provision. After this call to be kinder and gentler was ignored, Bush followed Reagan's 'New Federalism' lead by increasing the flexibility given to individual states by Reagan's Family Support Act. In simplifying the process whereby states ask for waivers from federal requirements, the Bush administration promoted welfare reform by pushing states to experiment further in the delivery of welfare benefits and services. These state-level welfare demonstration projects were often punitive and meanspirited, with welfare recipients often forced to work, go to school, get married or cease having children in exchange for their benefits. President Bush's welfare legacy was one of attaching a 'New Paternalism' (paying the poor less and asking them to do more) to Reagan's 'New Federalism'.
The move from Bush to Bill Clinton has not brought about a liberal counter-revolution in welfare policy. In fact, the exact opposite has occurred, with Democrats demonstrating that they too can get tough on welfare. With a campaign promise 'to end welfare as we know it', Clinton's election unleashed a plethora of welfare reform bills (e.g., the administration's own Work and Responsibility Act and the House Republicans' Personal Responsibility Act) that both mirror and extend Reagan's critique of welfare. Although Reagan's concerns over programme cost, state authority and family responsibility are still central, welfare reform now incorporates the notion of time limits. By placing time limits on the receipt of AFDC, recipients will be forced to work and meet even greater obligations in order to be eligible for benefits.
More recently, after presiding over 'a quiet revolution' in welfare policy by granting over 40 states permission to experiment with their own approach to welfare reform, the Clinton administration finally made good on its promise 'to end welfare as we know it'. On 22 August 1996, Clinton signed into law the 'The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996', which ended the 61-year-old federal guarantee of cash assistance for the poor. In saving approximately $55 billion dollars over six years, the new welfare law focuses on three distinct areas: state authority, personal responsibility and work. First, the act converts the AFDC programme into the 'Temporary Assistance to Needy Families' block grant, where funding is fixed and states determine how to run their programmes. Second, the new law imposes a five-year lifetime limit on welfare benefits, with states having the option of enacting even harsher restrictions. Finally, adults on welfare must work (or perform community service) within two years or risk losing their benefits. And if states do not meet federally set employment goals, their welfare block grant is reduced.
Apart from eliminating Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the new law is especially tough on legal immigrants (who are now ineligible for most government benefits) and food-stamp recipients (half of the law's spending reductions come from this programme). Additionally, unmarried teen-age parents are forced to stay in school and live with an adult in order to be eligible for assistance, and mothers must co-operate in identifying the fathers of their children or lose at least 25 per cent of their benefits. Provisional impact assessments of the new law estimate that anywhere from 1.1 to 3.5 million children could be pushed into poverty (Super et al., 1996) .
To summarise, throughout his administration, Reagan implemented policies -tax cuts, deregulation and changes in labour law -intended to address America's 'economic affliction'. Central to Reagan's growth strategy was an attack on means-tested social welfare programmes. By slowing expenditure growth, programmatic change, organisational restructuring, shifting the welfare debate and sowing the seeds of a new welfare reform consensus, Reagan attempted to reduce the size of the federal government, increase productivity, and enhance labour force flexibility. In attacking social provision, the administration redirected government policy and political debate away from the national priorities established during Roosevelt's New Deal (government intervention, downward redistribution of income and access to social provision).
With the outlay and programme changes discussed above, the Reagan administration did alter the nature of the US social safety net. This attack on the welfare system was accomplished through a reduction in benefit levels, a narrowing of eligibility criteria, and forced change in recipient behaviour. Because most of the administration's actions were directed against means-tested programmes, women, children and the working poor bore the brunt of the Reagan retrenchment legislation. The essence of Reagan's welfare legacy, in terms of both his ideology and legislative history, is that he has determined the political terrain upon which both Democrats and Republicans are currently residing. With regard to welfare, the Reagan administration narrowed the parameters of what is possible and what is desirable.
